Corruption is an issue that affects developing and developed countries alike. Businesses are often seen as fuelling the flames of corruption by engaging in corrupt practices in order to gain advantages over competitors in business deals. Since the mid-1990s the international community has been focusing on ways to increase business integrity by adopting conventions for ratification 
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It is trite to say that businesses play a central role in spreading corruption globally. Extortion and Bribery and the TI Business Principles for Countering Bribery. The expectation with all these instruments is that business organisations will act in a socially responsible manner towards corruption by putting in place measures ranging from adopting codes of conduct to promoting employee awareness and compliance with policies of the business organisation. In other words these instruments create an expectation that businesses will integrate anti-corruption measures within their corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda. CSR as a concept is traceable to the late 1950s and the expectation that companies should weave anti-corruption measures within their existing CSR policies is neither surprising nor unfair. The question however when it comes to corruption is whether these self-regulatory measures have made any noticeable impact on companies' practices and policies. The aim of this paper is to address this question through a survey of companies' policies and practices as expressed in their CSR statements and responses to questionnaires in the industrials, telecoms and technology sectors.
However before evaluating the findings of the empirical study, the various self-regulatory instruments formulated by major international organisations such as the OECD are outlined in Section I, and the concept of CSR is explored in Section II against an historical setting to delineate the common key features found in the various approaches to social responsibility within the corporate sector and the degree of overlap with corporate governance which is increasingly incorporating social concerns within its ambit. Section III evaluates the empirical findings and proposes, based on the findings, how the anti-corruption agenda may be better embedded in the corporate culture.
I. SELF-REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS PROMOTING BUSINESS INTEGRITY
That self-regulation as a tool to guide behaviour is preferred by most commercial entities is evidenced by the numerous illustrations of standard-setting found in the world of international seen within the standardisation of banking and accounting norms and this can be traced to the fourteenth century. 11 This self-setting of standards has become well-entrenched in modern times and is to be found in almost all sectors from accounting, insurance, banking and finance to human resource management. The advantages of self-regulation are that businesses are not placed under the stresses and pressures that come with state regulations and their requirements.
Self-regulation also contributes to the view that businesses see themselves as responsible entities capable of setting standards that shape their behaviour in a manner that reflects the realities and what is pragmatically possible. Self-regulation as a result of voluntary adoption also has the advantages of harmonising the rules of engagement readily and speedily in the face of diverse legal systems and the relative weaknesses of formalised regulatory opportunities created by international conventions. And more importantly, from a business perspective they can mould the regulatory framework (albeit part of it self-imposed) which governs them. A further advantage with self-regulation is that the responses to changing realities such as market and social expectations can be quick thus avoiding the delays surrounding legal regulation.
While standard-setting is of itself not new, a more recent development of the mid twentieth century has been a move to set terms of engagement in respect of responsibilities to the community at large often termed corporate social responsibility (CSR). In very general terms standard-setting in respect of CSR requires that companies go beyond profit seeking and protection of shareholders to include within their core issues social problems such as human rights and the environment. In accommodating these wider issues it is expected that companies engage with stakeholders other than shareholders. That it is good for businesses to venture outside the realms of meeting shareholder satisfaction is supported by the substantial amount of research often termed the 'business case' for CSR which suggests that the participation of a wider range of stakeholders, for instance, employees, consumers, local communities and the public at large improves economic efficiency and contributes to profits.
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CSR also is a convenient means to bridge the gap between changing social expectations and legal developments and unlike law which sets only minimum standards it is potentially more effective at promoting higher standards and a 'beyond compliance' attitude. The most common approach to CSR has been through the adoption of codes of conduct (individual or collective) or similar internal policies. 14 A recent report reveals that there is increasing support for this approach to CSR. A survey conducted by McKinsey and Company in 2007 found that more respondents were incorporating social (including human rights, labour and infectious diseases) and environmental issues than they had done in the previous five years. 15 Many respondents were also of the view that collective CSR oriented initiatives such as the UN Global Compact would have a far reaching influence on CSR policies.
There are obvious downsides to self-regulatory approach to CSR. It does not prevent 'rogue' businesses from abusing the standards accepted by the business community or by the business sector of which it is a member thus bringing with it grave doubts about the efficacy of the system.
The voluntary nature of CSR also means that 'laggards' are unlikely to become signatories.
Similarly 'free-riders' may take little or no action, therefore avoiding the cost of action, whilst hoping to absorb some of the benefits of the action of others, for instance improved public perceptions of the industry as whole. 16 The doubts to some extent may be addressed by introducing monitoring mechanisms and some level of external oversight of the application of the codes by trade associations or sector based institutions. Self-regulation in respect of CSR is also viewed by cynics, as nothing more than a 'Nestlé insists on honesty, integrity and fairness in all aspects of its business and expects the same in its relationships with all business partners and suppliers of materials, goods and services.
For that reason, our company has always endorsed efforts to fight corruption. Throughout our global operations, we are guided by the International Chamber of Commerce rules on extortion and bribery in international business transactions (1996) ; the OECD recommendations on Bribery and International Business Transactions of May 1994 and the OECD Convention to counteract corruption, which was signed by all the member countries and by Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and Slovakia in 1997 (the signatories undertake to consider corruption of foreign officials a penal act under their conduct, the anti-corruption standards formulated by the international organisations have the advantage of providing a common framework of reference and the likelihood of wider impact.
Some of the major anti-corruption standard-setting instruments are considered below.
(i) The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines)
The OECD Guidelines are aimed at promoting responsible business conduct and the governments adhering to these Guidelines include those who are home to the multinational enterprises (MNEs) and who are the largest source of investment and trade globally. The
Guidelines cover all areas of business ethics including labour, environmental standards and health and safety. Chapter VI of the Guidelines focusing on combating bribery was added in 2000 and its coverage is wider than that of the anti-bribery convention adopted by the OECD. 25 It includes provisions that aim to help in combating corruption such as enhancing transparency, promoting employee awareness of company policies in respect of bribery and compliance with company policies, and adoption of suitable management control systems, and accounting and auditing practices that prevent the use of 'off the books' or secret accounts. Illegal contributions to political parties or candidates seeking public office are also prohibited and there is a requirement that contributions, where made, comply with public disclosure requirements and are reported to senior management.
The OECD Guidelines are actively promoted and monitored through a National Contact Point To encourage the creation of safe channels for employees to report bribery without fear of reprisal the ICC has also adopted Guidelines on Whistleblowing.
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Its aim is to bring about inclusion of whistleblower policies in codes of conduct adopted by companies since it is in the business interests to be aware of and deal with a concern of their employee before an illegal act is committed. At this juncture it would be fair to raise doubts in tactical terms about the effectiveness of so many initiatives in bringing about real change, namely making companies 'actually' behave responsibly.
(iv) Transparency International's Business Principles for Countering Bribery
There is no doubt that the formulation of a single standard-setting instrument is a neat and attractive solution to achieving uniformity of standards. It must however be said that the risks are unlikely to be uniform across different sectors and different regions. The labour issues in the apparel industry in developing countries may be far different from those in the dairy sector in developed countries. Hence the need for bespoke standard-setting instruments, be it at an individual or a collective level.
II. THE FEATURES OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
The view that company management has responsibilities that go beyond the shareholders to include customers, employees and the public has been traced to the early years to the State and that the sole motive to ensure business success was profits. 43 The reasons for the gathering force of CSR have been attributed to a number of social movements ranging from women's rights, consumer rights and rights of the newly independent countries to a healthy environment. The growth of multinational corporations (MNCs) 44 and their economic and political might also contributed to growing demands for CSR from activists representing a range of interests from consumers and fair trade to workers and watchdogs devoted to human rights.
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The negative impacts arising from global business operations have also received attention, from the media, NGOs and the general public. 46 A development associated with globalisation is the shift in attention from national concerns, associated more with the Westphalian model, to a recognition of the transnational and interdisciplinary nature of many issues of public importance, particularly those associated with sustainable development and poverty reduction. This shift led to what has been perceived as a 'governance gap'. Multinational businesses undertook activities within a framework which did not always provide for their accountability. This was particularly highlighted in cases involving the apparel industry who employed complex multi-national supply chains and in which high profile failings initially saw companies deny responsibility. National laws applicable to companies often did not extend to impose liability in such situations. At the same time international law also failed to provide a mechanism for holding these important actors to account. 47 There was therefore a perceived problem arising from the disparity between the influence exerted by these actors and the mechanisms by which they could be held accountable. 
(i) CSR -Definitions and Characteristics
Given that CSR has been promoted since the 1950s it would be normal to expect a comprehensive and universally accepted definition of CSR. However, this unfortunately is not the case. The matter of definition is compounded further because of the emergence of new phrases such as 'corporate accountability', 'corporate governance' and 'corporate citizenship' that to some extent overlap with the key concept of responsibility driving CSR. A review of the literature on the social responsibility of business shows that definitions can be broadly categorised as those based either on a moral obligation where the commitment is made to the society at large or choice or discretion led where the commitment is made to society at large or to specific stakeholders.
Definitions that fall within the former category are normally to be found in the literature from the 1950s through to the 1970s. . Whilst these two definitions' see specific stakeholders as the object of the commitments Kotler & Lee see the commitment's object as society at large when they say that 'it is a commitment to improve well-being 57 through discretionary business practices and contributions of corporate resources'. 58 Regardless of these variations some common features emerge and are discussed below.
(a) Responsibilities pertaining to the triple bottom line
54 Once again the ambiguities in respect of 'society' remain. Does the reference in the definition to 'society as a whole' refer to global society or is it referring to a particular society without demarcating the different sectors and interest groups within a given society? In other words, the focus is on the environmental and social alongside the normally accepted focus of business, profit. In light of the increasingly sharp criticisms of business in the context of the rapid acceleration of globalization and activism from a number of quarters, CSR assumes that companies will recognise a broad spectrum of responsibilities, beyond that of profit maximisation. lack of specific reference to corruption it can be said that it is subsumed under the social.
(b) Application of the stakeholder model
A further feature of the CSR approach is a move away from the traditional approach which viewed businesses as being responsible only to shareholders, 63 to the stakeholder model which expects that responsibilities are owed not only to shareholders but to society generally and to groups, communities and individuals who may be affected by a company's operations. This in turn necessitates opportunities for these stakeholders to be identified and to be able to communicate their expectations and potentially to seek redress for violations of those responsibilities. NGOs have consequently assumed a strong role within CSR. Similarly, the media and the general public have also contributed towards influencing companies to assume responsibility toward non-shareholders.
(c) Emphasis on self-regulation
Another key feature is that CSR is widely viewed as a self-regulatory approach involving 'beyond compliance' action on the part of business. 65 CSR implies business taking responsibility in a way that is pro-active and focused on ensuring that the responsibilities assumed are met, rather than simply meeting minimum regulatory standards. Initial efforts in CSR in particular relied upon the adoption by companies of codes of conduct or other internal measures. This focus on self-regulation may be evolving towards a model which call for greater accountability thus raising the view that there is a 'a gradual hardening of soft rules '. 66 This could be arguably reflected through developments such as the UNGC which seek to bring CSR activities within a somewhat more transparent and accountable framework. Nevertheless business choices pertaining to CSR remain largely voluntary (see section I above).
(ii) CSR and Corporate Governance
Parallel to the developments in CSR there have been developments in corporate governance, the system of rules and processes which aim to provide for accountability, stability and transparency within a corporation. In regulating the exercise of decision making powers and The goal of CG is to provide the structures and processes which will allow businesses to achieve maximum economic efficiency, thus the underlying rationale of CG differs from that of most conceptions of CSR.
Another fundamental difference between CG and CSR is that whilst CSR emphasises the stakeholder model, CG, at least in terms of the Anglo-American model has traditionally followed the shareholder model 71 (in contrast to views that the African, Asian and Continental European models show stakeholder orientations, 'to a greater or lesser extent'.
72
) And even where stakeholder theory is embraced there is some debate as to whether it really does do away with the primacy of shareholder interests and the manager and shareholders as keys actors.
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CG's focus is internal, that is, on the responsibilities owed to corporate stakeholders and the need to maximise returns for shareholders, whereas CSR's focus is on the external, the various impacts of business operation on society and the stakeholders who may be impacted by them.
Although historically CSR and CG have some important paradigmatic differences, recent changes in governance structures and shifts in CSR perspectives have led to a reduction in the gap between these approaches. CG can potentially be a vehicle for achieving CSR by embedding social and environmental concerns into the management and decision-making processes of companies. Indeed, this strategy is more in line with the so called 'next generation' of CSR, focusing on corporate citizenship or accountability, which 'takes a firm beyond compliance to mitigating potential risks and looking for opportunities in the relationship between business and society. In this framework, issues such as climate change, rising obesity rates, the digital divide, 'Although the board is accountable to the company itself, the board should not ignore the legitimate interests and expectations of its stakeholders. In the board's decision-making process, the inclusive approach to governance adopted in King II dictates that the board should take account of the legitimate interests and expectations of the company's stakeholders in making decisions in the best interests of the company'
and that ' Sustainability [original emphasis] is the primary moral and economic imperative of the 21st century. It is one of the most important sources of both opportunities and risks for businesses. Nature, society, and business are interconnected in complex ways that should be understood by decision-makers. Most importantly, current incremental changes towards sustainability are not sufficient -we need a fundamental shift in the way The provision appears at first glance to include the triple bottom line as well as issues of corruption and bribery since they would be covered under s. 172(1)(e) dealing with reputation.
However, the primacy of the shareholders is highlighted in the opening words of s.172(1).
Admittedly, the director in being expected to 'have regard to' should balance the shareholders interests against those of the stakeholder. But 'having regard to' is a wooly phrase and prone to a variety of interpretations that may depend on existing circumstances that the director of a companies and directors act and organise themselves." The issues of corporate citizenship, sustainability, stakeholder sustainability and recent developments in CSR are discussed in further detail. for not giving greater priority to stakeholder issues.
So far we have considered the arguments for CSR, the features of CSR, collective anti-corruption codes and the possible common ground between CSR and CG. To make true inroads in the fight against corruption it is important to see how far businesses have internalized CSR and other initiatives in respect of combating corruption. The following section examines the findings of an empirical survey conducted by the authors.
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (i) Sample population profile
The findings reported below build upon the pilot data previously reported 79 and derive from a wider study investigating anti-corruption strategies and international business and comprise two main sources:
(1) Data collected from companies' websites. In this instance we analysed corporate web pages for references to CSR, CG and corruption in order to gain information about the extent to which companies have engaged with these concepts in a way which is publicly 80 In addition, we coded the main country of operation or head office of the company, the regions in which it operated and the stock exchanges on which it is listed. Some caveats apply here. Firstly, the data is derived from the company websites and thus inaccurate information would affect the findings, for instance where not all stock exchange listings are disclosed or countries of operation are not listed in full. Secondly, for the purpose of consistent analysis it was necessary to adopt working definitions of the categories of analysis and in a small number of cases companies who displayed relevant information on their website but which did not use the terms as adopted by the present authors would be regarded as not having the information on their website (for instance, companies who had given detail of the directors duties, remuneration committee, audit committee etc. but who had not used the term 'corporate governance'). Finally, the inclusion of references to the three categories on the company website does not tell us definitely whether the company has adopted policies or procedures in that area. A CSR policy may exist, for instance, but not be available on the website. Nevertheless, given the assumed importance of stakeholder demands and other drivers for the adoption of CSR policies it is in itself interesting to note the number of companies which have policies which are publicly available in this way. In addition to general references to 'corruption' or 'bribery' we also coded those websites which referred to specific potentially corrupt practices, for instance restrictions on giving or receiving gifts and hospitality. It is interesting to observe that in some cases these are prohibited or internally regulated but without express reference to corruption.
(2) Data collected through administration of a questionnaire which sought to investigate company experiences and attitudes towards different approaches to combating corruption.
The survey population is derived from publicly listed companies as published by The Times (London). The sample below comprises three sectors: Industrials (80 companies), Telecoms (27 companies) and Technology (154 companies). The majority of companies were based in the UK, particularly those in the Telecoms sector, with a small number of companies based in other countries, especially in China and the USA ( Table 1) . 81 We also coded the regions in which the company operated in based on website data ( Table 2) . 82 Unsurprisingly, given the source of the sample population, Europe was the most common region for companies to operate in, with 90% of coded companies operating here.
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Nearly all companies were, as would be expected, listed on a London stock exchange. However, the percentage of companies fully listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was low compared with the number listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM); 34% and 61% respectively.
The high number of AIM listed companies is surprising and the potential implications can be highlighted at this point: the AIM market is designed to facilitate growth in small and medium sized companies and has several features which aim to assist this. One of these features, along with others such as simplified admission procedures, is more 'relaxed' regulatory requirements, including those related to corporate governance. 84 This has potential implications for the prevalence of company CG statements, if not the other surveyed areas. Small numbers of companies were listed on a variety of other exchanges ( Figure 1 ) and as can be seen there were sectoral differences in these listings.
Missing values occur where it was not possible to collect the data, for instance where a company did not have a website or the website was not available. Figures given generally refer to the total number of coded cases (i.e. those for which data is available). 81 We coded the country of head office or main country of operation as identified by the company on its website. 82 In most cases the websites contained details of the companies' global operations on either a country or regional basis 83 For other regions the overall company presence was as follows: North America, 65%; Asia Pacific, 44%; Asia, 28%; Africa, 23%, Middle-East, 22%; South America 16%, Other 0.5%. 
(ii) Website content and influence of key variables
The number of companies referring to CSR on their website is quite low; 22% of the coded population, and the number referring specifically to corruption or bribery is lower still; less than 10%. 85 By contrast, the majority of companies did refer to CG (Figures 2 -4) .
At first glance these data suggest that whilst CG is embedded relatively strongly, the CSR and corruption agendas have made less of an impact. The level of reference (as a percentage) to the surveyed areas (CSR, CG, corruption) also differs on the basis of secondary variables -company sector, location of head office, region of operation and stock exchange listing. An understanding which of these variables influences others is important for gaining a greater understanding of the impact of anti-corruption efforts.
(a) Industry Sector
One important finding relates to sectoral performance. The Technology sector tends to lag behind Industrials and Telecoms (Table 4 ). This is particularly the case for corruption references.
The percentage of Technology companies referring to this issue on their website was at least half that of the other sectors. Telecoms and Industrials on the other hand are more closely aligned.
Again, understanding why these sectoral differences occur will enable a greater insight into the impacts and limitations of anti-corruption strategies. There are some further indications in the data below that the sector in which a company operates is an important variable in determining whether or not it refers to CSR, CG or corruption on its website.
(b) Head office/main country of operation
Head office location does not appear to account for companies' website content with respect to CSR, CG and corruption. Whilst the figures for the Industrials sector suggest that the main country of operation may be relevant to the likelihood that CSR, corruption, and CG will be referred to, this is not borne out by the figures for the other sectors.
The Telecoms sector, for instance, scored higher average figures (in terms of percentage of websites coded as referring to CSR, corruption or CG) for all of the surveyed aspects than average figures for companies based in the UK generally, despite the fact that 82% of Telecoms companies were based in the UK and that the remaining companies in this sector were based in the UAE, Italy and Ireland, all of which referred only to CG on their websites, with one further company based in Israel, which did achieve higher than average scores for corruption and CG but was below average for CSR (Tables 1 and 5 ).
Likewise, the Technology sector scored below average for all areas, lagging particularly with respect to corruption. This sector also had a relatively high number of companies based in the UK (68%) which might provide some explanation but also included six companies based in Canada, which scored 0% for CSR references but above average for CG and corruption. This sector 85 7.8% referred to specific aspects of corruption but in 15 of these 19 cases the website also referred to corruption/bribery generally. Switzerland, all of whom generally had higher than average levels for all aspects.
(c) Regional presence
Regional presence appears to have some bearing on the likelihood of a company referring to CSR, CG or corruption on their website. As can be seen in Table 6 , companies that operate in South America or Africa are the most likely to refer to CSR, corruption and CG on their websites followed by companies operating in the Middle East. Companies operating in Asia (for CG), Asia Pacific (for corruption and CSR), Europe or North America the were least likely to include a reference.
The Technology sector, which scored below average overall, had a lower than average presence in South America and in Africa (around half the percentage of other sectors, Table 2 ) and had a higher than average presence in North America, and slightly higher levels of companies operating in Asia-Pacific (though by smaller margins).
The Industrials sector, as has been seen, scored above average for all areas and had the highest percentage of references of all three sectors for corruption and CSR. This sector had a much higher presence in Asia, which scored the lowest for CG, than the other sectors but also had a lower presence in Asia Pacific, which achieved a lower score for corruption and had a lower presence in Europe than other sectors. Industrials however, also included slightly fewer companies operating in South America, Africa and the Middle East and more companies operating in North America than Telecoms (but fewer than the Technology sector).
Although the Telecoms sector includes a very high number of companies operating in Europe it
also includes the fewest number of companies operating in Asia by some margin -and has the highest sectoral coverage of CG, as well as having the lowest presence of all sectors in North America, a higher presence in the Middle East and the highest sectoral presence in South America and Africa. It also has a slightly higher presence in Asia-Pacific than Industrials; AsiaPacific is associated with fewer references to corruption and Telecoms scored lower than Industrials for corruption (similarly for CSR).
The data indicates that the region in which a company operates is associated with the likelihood that it will refer to the various aspects on its website. Sectoral differences appear to be relevant.
For example, Industrials companies based in Europe are more likely to refer to CSR than Telecoms companies and Technology companies are less likely still.
(d) Stock exchange listings
The data suggest that stock exchange listing may have some relationship with sectoral performance for present purposes. However, some aspects of these data are surprising and it does not appear that this variable provides a complete story.
Reference to the different areas surveyed varied according to stock exchange listing (Table 7) .
The AIM, the exchange most frequently used by listed companies (61% of cases), achieved very low scores, with the exception of CG which was in line with the average. AIM listed companies were identified as having around half the average number of references for CSR and one third of the average for corruption. LSE listed companies (34% coded companies), overall, had figures which were substantially above the overall average, particularly for CSR and corruption.
The proportion of companies listed on the AIM and the LSE is broadly comparable across sectors. However, although the Technology sector was the weakest in terms of website references it included fewer companies listed on the AIM than Telecoms (and a similar proportion to Industrials) and a slightly higher proportion of companies listed on the LSE ) ( Table 3 ).
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was relevant to the Industrials sector and particularly to The Technology sector in particular (as well as Industrials) included companies listed on the Toronto exchange and Technology also included the companies listed on NASDAQ exchange. As can be seen in the data, these exchanges performed above average, to varying degrees, with the exception of CSR references on the Toronto exchange.
As suggested, sectoral divisions appear again to have some relevance. For example, Industrials companies listed on the AIM exchange were more likely to refer to CSR and corruption than the other sectors.
(iii) Questionnaire data and perceptions of corruption and CSR
Data derived from the pilot phase of questionnaire have been reported elsewhere. 86 The inclusion of the two further sectors in addition to the Industrials sector which was the subject of the Pilot The response rate for the questionnaire was low -just 4% of companies completed the questionnaire (10 cases) though there was again some sectoral variation; the response rate was 7.4% for the Telecoms sector followed by 5% for Industrials. The most populous sector, Technology, again lagged behind with a response rate of only 2.6%.
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Survey participants provided information on the characteristics of their company and on this basis we find that in seven cases the company was reported to be based in the UK, with one company, from the Technology sector, based in 'various' locations, one company each based in the USA and the British Virgin Islands, both of which were in the Industrials sector (Table 2 ). Of the seven companies for which the variables were coded, six were identified as operating in Europe, three in Asia, three in the Middle-East, three in Asia Pacific, three in North America, three in South America, four in Africa and one in 'Other'. 90 The main variation in regional presence appears to come from the Technologies sector (Table 3 ).
All companies reported being listed on a UK stock exchange; the questionnaire did not ask them to distinguish further but cross-analysis indicates that four companies are listed on the LSE and five on the AIM (with one case uncoded). We also find that of two Telecoms companies, one was listed on the LSE and one on the AIM; of three coded Industrials companies, all were listed on the AIM, whereas three of the Technology companies were listed on the LSE and only one on the AIM. In addition, one Technology company is also listed in America and one (a different company) in Australia.
(a) Prioritisation of corruption in CSR
We asked participants to rank different listed components of CSR, in order of priority (Table 8) . 91 Their responses place corruption somewhere in the middle, with the most prioritised aspects being health and safety and equality and anti-discrimination, and the least prioritised being human rights and environmental protection. This differs from the figures reported in the pilot study which suggested that corruption was less prioritised and this change can be attributed to 87 Clearly there is a strong caveat relating to the questionnaire response rate and we must bear in mind that views expressed by participants may not be generalizable at this stage. 88 Response levels were also highlighted as a concern in the pilot study and influencing factors are discussed in Carr & Outhwaite (2008 a) op.cit. 89 In addition to this, a further 6.3% of companies provided a reason for non-participation. These included inter alia resource constraints (4 cases), company policy precluding participation (3 cases) and the company indication that it did not carry out any international business (3 cases) and the frequency of survey requests (2 cases). 90 The uncoded companies consisted of three of the four Industrials companies. 91 Giving a score of '1' to the most prioritised aspect and '6' to the least prioritised aspect.
the lesser priority afforded to human rights (compared with corruption) by responding Telecoms companies and to human rights and environmental protection by Technology companies (Table   9 ). There is, in this case, continued divergence of the Technology sector from the other sectors.
We also find that though there is some difference in the total scores between AIM and LSE listed companies, in both cases health and safety and equality and anti-discrimination are the most prioritised
(b) Motivations and Values
The data provides insights into company attitudes towards different regulatory approaches and influences (both formal and informal). The data set out in Table 10 , reveals that protection of corporate reputation is considered to be the strongest influence overall, followed by corporate ethical values and stock exchange listing requirements and then national law in the main country of operation and international law. 92 Thus the formalised sources of rules identified as the most influential in the pilot survey, and in particular the stock exchange rules, are still key influences for these companies but the company's internal values and reputation are also highly influential in guiding behaviour with respect to corruption. The less formalised sources are perceived to be less influential with the demands or influence of most external stakeholders (employees, consumers, the general public and NGOs -but not shareholders or board members) ranked as the least influential sources.
There is some sectoral variation here -for Technology companies the wish to remain competitive was ranked lower than the influence of NGOs, employee demand was a little more influential for companies in the Industrials sector, and for Telecoms companies, stock exchange requirements were slightly more important than corporate ethical values and consumer and general public demand were ranked more highly while national government policies were the second least influential source. These differences point toward different sectoral experiences both in terms of internal, corporate attitudes to combating corruption and with experiences of government policy and regulation (see also 'Views on anti-corruption rules and instruments' below).
Company attitudes were also explored through their views on the extent to which different factors would decrease or increase their likelihood of signing a new anti-corruption initiative (see Table   12 ). 93 The initiative having the status of a binding international legal instrument was the factor most likely to encourage membership of a new instrument, followed by the belief that the initiative would actually be enforced and the initiative reflecting the company's own morals or ethics. Also supported were the opportunity for a high level of input, the inclusion of a broad range of similar organisations, a major competitor signing up to the initiative, a requirement for standardised 92 We asked companies to rate different influences on a scale of 1 -10, with '1' indicating that the source had no influence at all and '10' indicating that it had been extremely influential. 93 Again based on a scale of 1 -10 with '10' indicating that the factor would strongly increase the likelihood of signing the anti-corruption initiative.
implementation and the likelihood that competitors will comply. The involvement of NGOs and consumers was seen in neutral or weaker terms, as was the agreement having the status of a voluntary agreement and the involvement of consumers in the negotiation. The least supported factors were the involvement of local NGOs, a major competitor refusing to sign up to the agreement, and the provision that organisations would be free to implement in their own preferred manner.
With respect to competitors it seems that whilst the involvement of a competitor may persuade a company to join a new initiative, their non-participation would not be a barrier to this. Again some preference for formal approaches with clear enforcement can be observed although there is also support for flexibility in internal implementation. Relatively little divergence in terms of the rating of factors relative to each other, is observed on a sectoral basis.
As well as indicating that compliance is an important concern, these views suggest that whilst there may be some scope for outside influence, external stakeholders are not strong drivers and the response of business seems rooted in the narrower context of regulatory requirements and the behaviour of competitors or others within the same industry. The fact that the initiative reflecting the company's own morals/ethics was the most important factor and the involvement of a broader range of stakeholders was seen as less significant lends weight to the idea that anticorruption efforts are more closely aligned with the traditional CG approach than with the traditional characteristics of CSR.
(c) Views on anti-corruption rules and instruments
Consistent with these attitudes, the General Listings Rules of the London Stock Exchange (LSE rules), the LSE Combined Code on Corporate Governance (CCCG) and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (US FCPA) were considered to be the most influential specific sources of rules (Table 11) . Certain other stock exchange requirements were seen as the least influential instruments though this is unsurprising given they are generally not applicable to participating companies (for instance the JSE and HKSE). 94 In general terms, beyond the three most influential instruments most other instruments received low or middling scores, but national legislative measures tended to be ranked the highest. Multi-stakeholder and voluntary initiatives received the lowest scores. The OECD, UN and EU Conventions ranked slightly higher but still with low scores. As discussed in the pilot survey, these perceptions could help with considering how future anti-corruption efforts might be more effectively structured, with more prescriptive or 94 The next least influential instruments were the SADC Protocol and the ECOWAS Convention.
The African Union Convention was rated slightly higher. This interesting given the fact that companies operating in Africa were among the most likely to include references to the areas examined on their websites. Further questions clearly arise in respect of both the impact of these conventions and the actual impact of these public corporate statements and policies.
formal rules possibly favoured over voluntary approaches, (although the summary data on website references and stock exchange listing, discussed above, suggests that other variables are also relevant).
The figures are fairly consistent across the three sectors in the ranking of international instruments but there is strong variation in perceptions of national legislation which is not fully explained by reference to stock exchange listing or regional presence. The greatest variation arose with respect to UK legislation, suggesting that different sectors have different experiences of these instruments. At this point we can only speculate on the possible reasons for this, for instance, company size, the nature of business arrangements, the level of risk perceived by regulatory authorities and associated monitoring and enforcement.
The LSE instruments received high scores although the CCCG received a lower average score from companies in the Industrials sector. It is possible that this reflects a weaker influence of the CCCG for AIM listed companies since all industrials companies were AIM listed. This might not be too surprising given the different requirements for AIM companies as regards this instrument.
LSE listed companies rated UK legislative and stock exchange instruments more highly than did AIM companies. 95 These findings would also tend to support the notion that voluntary and less formalised influences have a lesser impact 96 This is consistent with the website data in which CSR, CG, and corruption references were higher for LSE listed companies than for AIM listed companies (but with limited variation with respect to corporate governance). It may also be observed that the average ratings of UK legislation by the Industrials sector was lower than for other sectors. Yet interestingly this sector had the highest levels of website references for CSR.
Clearly however, the small number of participants prevents us from drawing an association at this point.
It could also be assumed that the companies based in the US and the BVI (both of which were located in the Industrials sector) would give lower ratings to the UK legislation and LSE instruments, since these would be less relevant. The data supports this but only partially; the US based company rated all relevant instruments as '1' with the exception of the LSE rules, which were rated '10'. The same pattern applied for the BVI based company, which rated the LSE rules and CCCG at '6' and the other instruments '1'. 95 Mean scores of AIM compared with LSE listed companies were: UK Proceeds of Crime Act 1.8:
7.5; UK Fraud Act, 2.2: 7.5, CCCG, 4.3: 8.8, LSE Rules, 6.4: 8.8. 96 Similarly, the American listed and US-based companies rated the NYSE rules as extremely influential.
IV. DISCUSSION
As seen in the previous section only a small number of companies make reference to corruption on their websites. The numbers referring to CSR more broadly are also low. Whilst the previous paragraph paints a gloomy picture there are a few rays of hope. A positive finding of this study reveals that amongst the small number of companies who completed the questionnaire, corruption, whilst not the most prioritised aspect of CSR, has, apparently at least, been taken on board. This is encouraging given the relatively short time period within which corruption has been a part of this agenda in comparison to issues such as health and safety and environment. It would be sensible to assume that those companies who completed the questionnaire are more likely to be active in terms of their anti-corruption efforts and this can in fact be said to be supported by the data. 98 However more needs to be done to raise the profile of CSR and the inclusion of corruption as a priority within CSR and in this recent highly publicised cases as Siemens and BAE may help towards generating awareness and suitable follow-up action on the part of companies,
In terms of references to CSR, CG, and corruption, differences in website content between sectors has also been observed, with the Technology sector lagging behind Industrials and
Telecoms. The data highlights some variables which may be associated with this difference but 97 With respect to CG there were also several companies who displayed CG information such as identification of Directors but who did not use the term CG and were therefore coded accordingly. 98 Companies which had completed the questionnaire were more likely to refer to the various categories, particularly regarding corruption and CSR: 22.2% of responding companies referred to corruption on their website compared with 8.9% overall; for specific aspects of corruption these figures were 22.2% compared with 7.2%; for CSR they were 55.6% compared with 20.1% and for Corporate Governance they were 56.6% compared with 55.7%.
further data is needed in this respect. As well as the possibilities explored in preceding sections there may be further characteristics of the Technology sector which require further exploration.
Similarly we have seen that sectoral experiences of national instruments in particular may vary and it is hoped that future analysis may help to reveal the nature of these differences. One hypothesis that can be put forward is that the sectors which have seen most attention from 'external' stakeholders, for instance having been the subject of campaigns or boycotts, may be most likely to have made efforts or at least adopted public statements, with respect to corruption and/or CSR. In the present case the Industrials sector contains a number of companies involved in relatively high risk business in this respect, and is also the sector most likely to refer to CSR or corruption on company websites. On the other hand, the relatively poor performance of the Technology sector is interesting if it is assumed that many companies listed within that sector are comparatively new and might therefore be expected to be more likely to engage more frequently with issues such as CSR and anti-corruption on the basis their internal policies would have followed the introduction of relevant instruments as well as civil society efforts, as opposed to older companies who may still be engaged with the process of 'catching up' in the light of recent legal and civil society expectations. This demographic picture however is not supported by the data and this remains another area which could usefully be explored in more detail.
The limited engagement with CSR compared with the more common inclusion of CG information lends weight to the hypothesis that the CG model is more effective in terms of achieving desired 'compliance', in this case with respect to certain requirements for disclosure and reporting.
Further data derived from the questionnaire suggests that the participating companies consider themselves to be influenced more by formalised sources or those associated with the narrower field of the market (through stock exchange instruments) and internal influences such as shareholder demands than with broader collaborative or voluntary approaches.
There is something of a paradox when examining the influence of different sources. Protection of corporate reputation is considered highly influential yet at the same time factors which are likely to be linked to reputation -such as responding to consumer demand -are seen to be relatively insignificant by the respondents. such as consumers, civil society and industry associations or a combination of both the internal and external stakeholders. The reputation of a company is also bound by the context in which the question is posed. It could, for instance, be posed in relation to the organisation's creditworthiness and ability to repay debts on time or in relation to CSR. Where the question of reputation has been raised in the context of CSR it follows that the good reputation of an organisation is dependent on that organization engaging with the core elements of CSR as outlined in Section 1 above and the perception of others (external and internal stakeholders).
The findings discussed here however suggest that in the present context companies conceive of reputation issues within a relatively narrow sphere, concerning themselves more with the perceptions and behaviours of similar organisations or internal (senior) stakeholders, rather than the broader stakeholder community.
These findings and subsequent arguments point to the possibility that, with respect to corruption at least, companies' behaviours and attitudes are not closely aligned with the key characteristics of CSR. Rather than adopting the externally focused model which CSR implies, company attitudes in this area are more reflective of the traditional, shareholder model and with the CG approach which is still closely aligned with that model thus raising two key policy implications.
Firstly further close examination of CSR strategies is needed to see how these can be targeted to bridge the gap with company attitudes. Secondly, since CG is seen to have been relatively widely between reputation and commercial success and the concept of reputation was explained in the following manner: 'For a company, its reputation will derive from the quality of the product or service, its financial performance and treatment of staff, its leadership and its stand on the ethical issues it faces. So a company needs to test day-to-day commercial decisions by asking itself "would this action (or inaction) damage the company's reputation in the mind of a right thinking person?" This test is similar to those used commonly for ethical situations: "how would I feel about others knowing of my decision?", or "how would this be reported in tomorrow's newspaper?" '(At 2.6) The Woolf Committee was of the view that a company's reputation is linked to a range of factors:
'The range of factors that may impact upon a company's reputation and be covered by the term "unethical business conduct" is broad and challenging. adopted and is seen as influential, the possibility of introducing anti-corruption requirements on a more formalised basis into the CG framework may be fruitful. The caveats previously emphasised however should be remembered at this point. The response rate for questionnaires was low with consequent implications for generalizability and at this stage only three sectors have been considered. Future analysis will investigate the full range of sectors included in The Times listing and this will allow further investigation of these hypotheses.
CONCLUSION
Those hoping to see corruption swept up and addressed by a wave of traditional CSR activity are likely to be disappointed. However it seems that corporate governance structures may provide a more effective route. This is not to say that companies should be viewed as 'bad actors', seeking to do the minimum necessary in order to comply. Rather, it may be that the increased clarity and certainty which mandatory or at least more formalised approaches tend to involve, is favoured by companies in preference to 'going it alone'. At the same time, the data suggests that traditional business interests and behaviours prevail over the newer, broader CSR mandate. In this respect corruption has some advantages over other aspects of CSR insofar as it is more closely aligned with existing governance controls related to directors duties, reporting and accounting and auditing requirements. The potential for anti-corruption efforts to be introduced more directly through CG frameworks therefore appears quite strong. There is, however, a need for further examination of empirical data before any such proposals can be advanced with vigour.
Despite the apparent limitations of CSR explored in this article, it could be argued that now is an opportune time for this model to be developed and more strongly embedded. One possible outcome of the 'global credit crunch' might be a renewal of interest in the effective regulation of corporations and, as suggested by Utting, a move towards 'corporate accountability'. The apparently reckless behaviour of some corporate actors has highlighted in a dramatic fashion the risks associated with a focus on the 'bottom line' and in this sense perhaps opens the door to renewed efforts, whether based on regulation or otherwise, to pursue a broader range of corporate responsibilities. The data reported above indicate possible directions for improved strategies with respect to the corruption component of this agenda. It is hoped that there is sufficient political, business and community will to follow these directions thus contributing to dousing the flames of corruption. 100 N denotes number of companies analysed for the given analysis -where less than the full set of companies is indicated this is due to missing data. National laws in other countries of operation 7.0
Industry specific codes or initiatives 6.9
[National] Government policies 6.8
Shareholder demand 6.7
General voluntary initiatives 6.1
Economic benefits/operational efficiency 6.1
Wish to remain competitive 5.8
Consumer/client demand 5.7
Employee demand 5.7
Attitudes of general public 5.6
Influence of NGOs or pressure groups 4.6
Other (please specify) --. 
Source of influence (as listed) Mean
The initiative having the status of a binding international legal instrument 8
The belief that the initiative would actually be enforced 8
The initiative reflecting the organisation's own 'ethics' or 'morals' 8
The opportunity for a high level of input 7
The inclusion of a broad range of similar organisations in the negotiation 7
A major competitor signing up to the initiative 7
A requirement for standardised implementation 7
The likelihood that competitors will comply 7
The provision for enforcement of the initiative by an external body 6
The provision for enforcement of the initiative internally 6
A high level of external pressure to achieve the initiative 6
The involvement of multi-country NGOs or similar bodies in the negotiation 5
The involvement of consumers in the negotiation 5
The initiative having the status of a voluntary agreement 5
The involvement of local (national or smaller) NGOs or similar bodies in the negotiation 4
A major competitor refusing to sign up to the initiative 4
The provision that organisations would be free to implement the initiative in their own preferred manner 4 
